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MARY A. MURPHY, d.b.a. ALEX PICKER- ^
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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

This brief is submitted in behalf of the defendant,
Public Service Commission and all other named defendants. The defendant Public Service Commission of
Utah will be referred to herein as "Commission". The
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other named defendants will sometimes be referred to
herein as "protesting motor carriers" or "defendants".
The respective plaintiffs herein will be referred to as
"Mary A. Murphy" and "Pickering Transfer Company,
Inc." and will sometimes be collectively referred to as
"plaintiffs."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Public Service Commission to transfer a common motor carrier certificate of
public convenience and necessity and a contract motor
carrier permit.
DISPOSITION BY THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Commission in its Order under date of October
30, 1974, denied the application of plaintiffs to transfer
the contract motor carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy
to Pickering Transfer Co., Inc. The Commission also
denied, without prejudice, that part of the application
by which plaintiffs sought to transfer the separate certificate of public convenience and necessity.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs pray that the Commission's Order
under date of October 30,1974, be reversed and remanded
with direction that the transfer application be approved.
The defendants urge the Court to sustain the Commission's Order.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mary A. Murphy presently holds operating authority
from the Commission both as a common and as a contract motor carrier. Even though protestants indicated
initially they were not challenging the transfer of the
certificate of public convenience and necessity as alleged
by plaintiffs on page 5 of their brief, said protestants
after hearing the evidence, and prior to the conclusion
of the hearing on April 6, 1973, challenged the fitness
of plaintiff to hold any authority from the Commission
and protested the transfer of authority (R. 186,190-191).
The common motor carrier authority generally authorizes the transportation of general commodities as a
cartage carrier between specified points in Salt Lake and
Davis Counties, Utah. The contract motor carrier authority of Mary A. Murphy authorizes her to transport commodities as follows:
"Contract Carrier Permit No. 130
To operate as a contract motor carrier of all
kinds of personal property including merchandise, machinery, and other property which she
has occasion to carry in the course of the conduct of her said transportation business within
a 50-mile radius of Salt Lake City, excluding
pickup and delivery service within the area described in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 684" (R. 55). (Emphasis added.)
The scope of the conitract motor carrier authority
was recently interpreted by this Court in Murphy v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Public Service Commission, 30 Utah 2d 140, 514 P. 2d
804 (1973) (R. 85-87). The count did not have before
it issues involving the transfer of contract carrier permits.
On February % 1973, an application was filed with
the Commission by Mary A. Murphy and Pickering
Transfer Company, Inc. Whereby Piickering Transfer
Company, Inc. sought to acquire all the operating authority of Mary A. Murphy pursuant to a contract between
Mary A. Murphy and Max W. Young. Effectively, the
agreement between Max W. Young and Mary A. Murphy,
et al., divested Mary A. Murphy, Paul J. Murphy and
Charles E. Murphy from any interest whatsoever in
Mary A. Murphy, d.b.a. Pickering Transfer Company
effective March 1, 1972, From that day forward, the
said Mary A. Murphy and her sons were insulated against
liability and deprived of profits. As a amsideration, Mary
A. Murphy and her two sons, received a down payment
of $5,000 cash and were entitled to monthly payments
of $300 each month commencing April 1, 1972, and for
a period not to exceed 28 months. In addition, a payment
of $10,000 is due upon final approval of the transfer of
all authorities. In the event the Commission does not
approve the transfer of the contraot carrier permit, the
remaining $10,000 shall not be paid (Ex. 4). Effectively,
Mary A. Murphy and her sons have been fully paid for
the certificates of public convenience and necessity and
equipment.
The application was duly processed by the Commission and set for hearing on April 6, 1973 (R. 14). The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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protesting motor carriers who are now the defendants
herein appeared at said hearing to contest the transfer
application ( R 13).
At the hearing on April 6, 1973, a statement was
made by the witness Max W. Young as General Manager for Mary A. Murphy that he had read the application and that the application stated his testimony (R.
161). The applicant introduced a profit and loss statement covering the period January 1, 1973 to February
28,1973, (R. 66), a balance sheet as of February 28,1973,
(R. 67), and an equipment list (R. 66A). In addition,
the applicants asked the Commission to take official
notice of the profit and loss statement filed as a part
of the annual report of Mary A. Murphy to the Commission for the year 1972 (R. 163). The financial statements and the equipment list represented the financial
condition and equipment of the transferror Mary A.
Murphy and not the financial condition or the equipment
of the transferee, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. In
an effort to correct this defect, applicants' counsel asked
that those exhibits be treated as the pro forma financial
statements and equipment list for the corporation, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. Said exhibits were received
on stipulation of counsel (R. 197).
No agreement for the purchase and sale between
Mary A. Murphy and Pickering Transfer Company, Inc.
was offered in evidence. The only agreement offered
was a contract of purchase between Max W. Young and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mary A. Murphy, which contract was identified as Exhibit 4 (R. 5-10).
No contract shipper appeared in support of the applicant, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc.,, nor was any
contract offered disclosing the willingness of any person
to contract with the proposed transferee, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. The only schedule of rates and charges
received in evidence was a schedule of rates and charges
filed with the Commission on December 23, 1974 naming
rates and charges for the accounts of Campbell Soup
Company and Industrial Supply Company.
The only evidence offered concerning any service
provided by Mary A. Murphy was the testimony of Max
W. Young relating to cervice performed for Campbell
Soup Company. Under oath, Mr. Young testified that
said service was performed in intrastate commerce pursuant to contract motor carrier permit No. 130 (R. 163,
164-172, 180-185). On April 16, 1973, Max W. Young
filed an affidavit with the Commission correcting his testimony of April 6, 1973 and disclaiming any intrastate
service by Mary A. Murphy for the account of Campbell
Soup Company for the year 1972 (R. 19-20).
On December 3, 1973^ the protesting motor carriers
filed their Petition to Reopen and for Further Hearing
with the Commission. The petition was based, among
other things, on a material change of circumstances resulting from the decision in Case No. 12920 of this Count
which interpreted the scope of Mary A. Murphy's conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tract carrier peanut {ix. zl--i-v: ' muarv 31, 1974,
the Commission ordered that sai«) pH<tM>n \*- sencd on
all parties and that all partie- ii^SI?IL
SO submit
memorandums an*! 'mrf- to tiw Commission -a* or before Feibruary 15, 1^.'}. with respect to said petition (R.
25). Responsive documents were subsequently filed with
the Commission bv counsel for plaintiffs and counsel
for defendamts.
On July 9, lift4, uit uommission served its Order
granting the petition to reopen the proceeding and setting
the date of July 26, 1974 for further hearing. On said
date, the Commission heard argument tnm; counsel on
both sides with mspoa u- * T.OIMII ^ lismiss the application and the burden of pi-ool io IK »»O: !** M'»f applicants. The Commissi,>n look admit * ira i * notice of
the Supreme Con it ruling in Case No, 129'20. Subject
to certain objections reserved by applicants' counsel, the
parties stipulated that each of tiic protesting motor carriers could establish through testimony and documentary
evidence that they had each made substantial investments in plant and equipment to serve the territory
which is involved in the contract carrier permit of Mary
A. Murphy; that each protectant depends upon traffic
originating within that same area to support the remaining territory served by each of tbem; and that if "the
contract carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy were transferred, that each of the protesting motor carriers would
'be materially and adversely affected (R. 222). The Commission, subsequently took administrative notice of *"*•
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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annual reports of Mary A. Murphy and contracts filed
through July 26, 1974 (R. 223).
On October 30, 1974, the Commission issued its Report and Order wherein it reviewed the entire record and
the applicable law. In said Report and Order the Commission concluded that the applicants had not met their
burden of proof and that the transfer of the contract
carrier permit from Mary A. Murphy to Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. should be denied. The Commission
went on to explain that it could not determine the fitness and ability of the proposed transferee based on the
record before it. Further, the Commission said that since
there was no agreement between the transferror and
the transferee, it could not deteirmine the value of the
certificate apart from the value of the contract carrier
permit and therefore could not separately transfer the
certificate based on the record before it (R. 54-56).
The applicants subsequently filed a petition for rehearing which was denied by the Commission on December 6, 1974 (R. 64).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED
THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF THE CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT OF MARY A.
MURPHY TO PICKERING T R A N S F E R
COMPANY, INC. BECAUSE THE APPLIDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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FAILED TO SATISFY THE MINIMUM STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS.
CAIN I D

In its decision "under date of October iM), II"! 174, Uie
Commission concluded as follows:
"Rule No. 2 [II] of the Motor Carrier Rules and
Regulations effective June 1, 1937, which deals
with certificates of public convenience and necessity, together with case law expressly state and
hold 'that a person desiring to assume the operating rights of someone else 'will not be required to prove public convenience and necessity.' Rule No. 3 [III] of the Motor Carrier
Rules and Regulations, which rule specifically
deals with permits, expressly provides, 'the parson desiring to assume said operating rights shall
comply with the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws
of Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit/ We
aire of the opinion that the Commission's rules,
except where expressly modified, are still in
full force and effect. In fact, the validity of said
rules were not challenged and were expressly
referred, to by the court 'in, the case of Murphy
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, supra.
Critical to the transfer of a contract carrier permit is the introduction by applicant of evidence
that the grant of the application will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the people
of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to
be served. Additionally, applicants must demonstrate that existing transportation facilities
do not provide adequate or reasonable service.
Applicants have not met their burden of proof
and the transfer of the contract carrier permit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
from Mary A. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering
Transfer, to Pickering Transfer Company, Inc.
should be denied" (R. 56). [Emphasis and
bracketed information added.]
The Commission properly concluded that the applicants had not met their burden of proof in order to transfer the contract carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy to
Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. The record before the
Commission is seriously deficient in two particular respects in that the applicant did not demonstrate that 1)
transfer of the contract carrier permit would not be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the State
of Utah and/or the localities to be served and 2) that
existing transporfcation facilities do not provide adequate
or reasonable service.
The Commission adhered to its Motor Carrier Rules
and Regulations No. 3 issued June 1, 1937 in reaching
its decision. The full text of these regulations is set
forth as Exhibit 37 in the Special Record in this proceeding. The Commission is authorized to issue such
regulations by virtue of Section 54-6-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides:
"Powers of commission. — The commission is
hereby vested with power and authority and it
may supervise and regulate every contract motor
carrier in this state and fix and approve reasonable maximum or minimum rates, fares, charges
and classifications, and to adopt reasonable rules
and regulations pertaining to all such motor carriers."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rule No. HI of the Commission's Motor Carrier
Rules and Regulations No. 3 governs the transfer of contract carrier permits. The pertinent portions of Rule III
provide as follows:
"(d) In the event a person operating under
a permit issued by the Commission enters into
an agreement with another person to sell, assign,
or transfer the operating rights covered by said
permit the following procedure shall be followed
before the Commission:
"A joint application shall be filed by the persons
involved which application shall request authority for the one person to discontinue operations
as a motor carrier and fcxr the other person to
assume and take over said operations as a motor carrier. The person desiring to assume said
operating rights shall comply with the provisions
of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing
for a new permit."
The applicable provision of Chapter 65 of the Laws
of Utah, 1935, to which the regulation refers is Section
9 which provides in part:
"* * * The commission upon the filing of
an application for a contract motor carrier's permit by any other person than those referred to
above in this section shall fix a time and place
for hearing thereon and shall give the same notice as provided in section 6 hereof. The commission shall also subpoena a member of the
state road commission to be present at said hearing and said member or representative designated by said road commission shall offer testiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
mony as to the character of the highway over
which said contract motor carrier proposes to
operate and the effect thereon; and upon the
traveling public using the same. If, from all the
testimony offered at said hearing, the commission shall determine that the highways over
which the applicant desires to operate are not
unduly burdened; that the granting of the application will not unduly interfere with the traveling public; and that the granting of the application will not be detrimental to the best interest
of the people of the state of Utah and/or to the
localities to be served, the commission shall grant
such permit; * * *."
In order to understand the full meaning of Section 9,
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, it is necessary to examine
the statutory history of the section in order to determine
the criteria by which the Commission is to operate pursuant to its Rule III with respect to the transfer of contract motor carrier permits.
The predecessor statute to Section 9, Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah, 1935, is Section 13, Chapter 53, Laws of
Utah, 1933. Section 13 provides in pertinent part:
"* * * Before granting a permit to a contract motor carrier, the commission shall take
into consideration the character of the highway
over which said contract motor carrier proposes
to operate, and the effect thereon, and upon the
traveling public using the same and also other
existing transportation facilities and whether or
not there is any real necessity for the service
proposed to be rendered, and if it appears from
the evidence that the highway is, in the opinion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the commission, already unduly burdened
with traffic and that additional traffic will unduly interfere with the traveling public, or that
the service furnished by the existing transportation facilities is reasonably adequate and that
there is no real need for any additional transportation facilities, the commission shall not
grant such permit. * * *"
Section 13, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933, contains an
additional criterion not expressly found in Section 9,
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935. That criterion is the
adequacy of existing transportation facilities. However,
as will be explained below, that criterion is necessarily
implied in the best interests test found in Section 9,
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935.
Section 9, Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, was carried forward into the Utah Code of 1943 as Section 76-521 without change.
In 1945, Section 76-5-21, Utah Code of 1943, was
amended to expresly include the criterion of adequacy
of existing transportation facilities, which criterion had
apparently been inadvertently omitted from Section 9,
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, when Chapter 53, Laws
of Utah, 1933, was revised. Section 76-5-21, Utah Code,
1943, following amendment, read in pertinent part, as
follows:
«* * * rpjie CJOjm^jggJQin upon the filing of an
application for a contract motor carrier's permit
shall fix a time and place for hearing thereon
and may give the same notice as provided in secDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion 76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony
offered at said hearing, the commission shall
determine that the highways over which the
applicant desires to operate are not unduly burdened; that the granting of the application will
not unduly interfere with the traveling public;
and that the granting of the application will not
be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the state of Utah and/or to the localities
to be served* and if the existing transportation
facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable
service, the commission shall grant such permit."
Section 76-5-21, Utah Code, 1943 (as amended) was
carried forward without change as Section 54-6-8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
Plaintiffs contend that the Commission erred in incorporaiting the adequacy of existing transportation facilities test as a part of its decision. Plaintiffs contend that
the Commission should have strictly applied its Rule
III as the same refers literally to "Chapter 65, Laws of
Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit." Plaintiffs'
evidence was so inadequate that it did not even meet
the requirements of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935.
Regardless, the Commission properly applied the current statutory criteria as the same are presently embodied in Section 54-6-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The Commission is an administrative body created
by the Legislature to supervise and regulate, as here
pertinent, the transportation of property by motor vehicle within the State. Rowley v. Public Service Commission, et al., 112 Utah 116, 122, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As the servant of the Legislature, any rules and regulations of the Commission must be in accord with and not
exceed the bounds of the statutes from which its authority is derived. While Rule III of the Commission's regulations has not been amended since 1937, the body of
law to which it makes reference, Chapter 65, Laws of f
Utah, 1935, has been amended by the Legislature.The *
United States Supreme Court has previously held that
an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62, 23 L. Ed, 2d 101,
89 S, Ct. 1519 (1969). While the regulation embodied
in Rule III does not literally refer to the present underlying statute due to the fact that amendment of the
regulations has not kept pace with amendment of the
statutes, the Commission has placed an interpretation
upon its own regulation that makes the same harmonious
and consistent with the present body of statutory law.
The intent of the regulation is plain on its face that any
party proposing to acquire a contract motor carrier permit by transfer should comply with the appropriate laws
as though he were applying for a new permit.
As noted above, statutory law prevails over related
regulations in the event of an inconsistency. To do otherwise, would frustrate the legislative intent. If, however,
a mechanical approach to statutory construction is taken,
as advocated by plaintiffs, the law still provides that the
Commission's regulations must incorporate the current
statutory criteria.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When a regulation is legislative in character, the
rules of interpretation applicable to statutes should be
used in determining the meaning of the regulation. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 1A, Section
31.06—"Administrative Regulations^—Interpretation". In
State of North Dakota, ex rel. Public Service Commismission v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., (N. D. 1958),
89 N. W. 2d 94, the court was faced with two inconsistent
statutes dealing with procedure on utility rate increases.
The court there said:
" 'When a subsequent enactment covering a field
of operation coterminous with a prior statute
cannot by any reasonable constmction be given
effect while the prior law remains in operative
existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative expression prevails, and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict/ Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2012.
'The subsequent enactment of a statute which
treats a phase of the same general subject matter in a more minute way consequently repeals
pro tanto the provisions of the general statute
with which it conflicts/
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec.
2022; State ex rel. Lofthus v. Langer, 46 N. D.
462, 177 N. W. 408; Hagstrom v. Estherville
School Diet. No. 43, 67 N. D. 56, 269 N. W. 93."
The section cited by the North Dakota court in Sutherland Statutory Construction provides further that legislative intent is the key to statutory interpretation and
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH - CASE NO. 13926
(To be inserted at page 15 of brief of defendants.)
Specifically, Rule III is now subject to Section 54-6-8
Utah Code Annotated 1953 and not the 1935 laws.
Where a conflict arises between a statute and a
corresponding agency regulation, the statute must prevail in
order that the legislative purpose will be accomplished.
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Edition, Volume 1A,
Section 31.02-flAdministrative Regulations-Validity" provides:
"Since the central legislative body is the
source of an administrative agency's power,
the provisions of the statute will prevail
in any case of conflict between a statute
and an agency regulation." County of Los
Angeles v. State Department of Public
Health, 158 Cal. App. 2d 425, 3?T~P~2d
968 (1958).
In applying its Rule III to transfers of contract
motor carrier permits, the Commission must look to fulfill
the legislative purpose and in doing so must consequently apply
the criteria as presently set forth in Section 54-6-8
Utah Code Annotated 1953. An administrative agency must
look to the statute for its obvious purpose and that purpose
is not to be overcome by resort to mechanical rules of
construction.

Rucker v. Wabash Railroad Company, 418 F. 2d

146 (1969); Rowley v. Public Service Commission et al,, supra,
at 112 Utah 121.
In interpreting the Commission's regulation as
embodied in Rule III, the meaning of the regulation is best
determined from the Commission itself.

In Barton Truck Line,

Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 102, 440 P. 2d
972 (1968), this court said at 21 Utah 2d 105:
"The one most likely to know what was meant
by a given expression is the one who made
it. The Public Service Commission used the
language, and it should know better than
anyone else what was meant."
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thait counts must strive to satisfy that intent in applying
rules of statutory construction.
Crawford, Statutory Construction — Interpretation
of Laws, Section 303, provides:
"Since an amendment becomes a part of the
original statute, both must be ronstrued together
as if they constituted one enactment, even if
the amendment occurs merely by implication*
Their provisions should be harmonized, if possible, but where there is irreconcilable awiflict,
the provisions of the amendemeot must prevail
over those of the original statute on the theory
that the former constitutes the last expression
of the will of the legislature."
Section 304 of the same treatise provides:
"The amended statute should also be construed
as if it had been originally passed in its amended
form, since the amendment becomes a part of
the original enactment. * * *"
In New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 358 F. 2d 464 (1966), the court was faced with a
labor dispute in which the Norris-LaGuarclia Act and
a subsequent public law were inconsistent. There the
court stated:
"A specific act of the nature of Public Law 88108 is generally held to amend by implication
any preceding general statute of the nature of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. §101) in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conflict therewith. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co., 363 U. S. 30, 41-42, 77 S. Ot. 635, 1
L. Ed. 2d 622 (1957); Virginian Railway v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 563, 57
S. Ct. 502, 81 L. Ed. 789 (1937)."
In Petition for Naturalization of Mirzoeff, 143 F.
Supp. 177 (1956), the court interpreted three statutes
enacted at different times dealing with the same subject
matter. The latest statute to be enacted, similar to the
instant situation, added a new requirement as well as
adopting the substance of the prior law. There the court
said::
"* * * The three statutes cover the same
subject matter. Thus, to the extent that the
1952 statute adds a new requirement it impliedly
amends the earlier statutes. * * *"
In the instant matter, the Commission's Rule III
makes reference to the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws of
Utah, 1953. The reference made is thus to a general body
of law and not to a specific statute, although specific
statutes within Chapter 65 govern the transfer of contract
motor carrier permits. In Somermeier v. District Director of Customs, 448 F. 2d 1243 (1971), the court was
confronted with a situation where the California law
adopted the appropriate provisions of federal law by
reference. The issue was whether the court should apply
the federal law at the time the California statute was
enacted or the federal law as it was subsequently changed.
There the court said:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Under California law, when, by statute, reference is made to general law rather than to a
specific statute, the adopted laws are taken not
only in their contemporary form but also as they
may be changed from time to time. * * *"
The statutory history of the subject Utah legislation, as set forth above, indicates that in 1933 adequacy
of existing transportation facilities was one of several
criteria that the Commission was to consider in granting
or transferring contract motor carrier permits. In the
1935 revisions of this body of law, this criterion was
apparently inadvertently omitted because the same was
reinstituted by the Legislature in 1945 and has been carried forward into subsequent Utah statutes. In Jefferson
County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, (Ky., 1971), 463 S. W. 2d 627, Cert, den.,
404 U. S. 865, the court was faced with a situation remarkably similar to the Utah statutory history in the
instant matter. The Kentucky case was concerned with
the right of teachers to strike. In 1940, the Kentucky
Legislature enacted a statute governing employer-employee relations. The 1940 act set forth the right to collectively bargain, strike and so forth, but the 1940 act
contained an express exclusion relating to employees of
federal and state bodies and political subdivisions and
agenciese. In 1942 the Kentucky statutes were completely
revised and the subject exclusion was carried forward
into certain statutory provisions governing wages and
hours but not into the subject Department of Labor statute. The court there held that the legislative policy had
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been expressed in the earlier 1940 act and that the exclusion with respect to strikes by public employees must
be read into the subsequent "Department of Labor"
statute. There the court said at page 629:
"The original Act pertaining to employer-employee relations clearly and expressly excluded
public employees from the granted right to
strike. The apparently inadvertent omission of
this exclusion in Chapter 336 when the statutes
were revised cannot be held to have changed
the legislative policy and the law. Therefore
appellants cannot properly claim the legislature
has granted them such right, and their principal
contention must fell."
In the instant matter, not only was the legislative
policy with respect to the adequacy of existing transportation facilities expressed in 1933, but when the omission
was discovered, the Legislature took pains to correct the
omission in 1945 and carried the corrected statute forward into the 1953 Code. Clearly, the criteria to be considered by the Commission in applying its Rule III with
respect to the transfer of contract carrier permits is the
legislative policy as set forth in the 1953 Utah Code,
which latter Code contains the same basic criteria as
originally established by the Utah Legislature in 1933.
To do otherwise, would do violence to the legislative intent which is clearly expressed and would contravene
existing case law. The Commission properly applied its
regulations and the law to the case before it.
In its decision, the Commission also concluded that
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the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof with
respect to demonstrating that "the grant of the application will not be detrimental to the best interests of the
people of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to be
served" (R. 56). This criterion necessarily embodies an
examination of the adequacy of existing transportation
facilities. In 1933,, the Legislature set forth the purpose
of its act. Section 34, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933,
provides:
The business of operating as a motor carrier
for hire along the highways of this state is declared to be a business affected with the public
interest. The rapid increase of motor carrier
traffic, and the fact that under existing law many
motor vehicles are not effectively regulated, have
increased the dangers and hazards on public
highways and make it imperative that more
stringent regulation should be employed, to the
end that the highways may be rendered safer
for the use of the general public; that the wear
of such highways may be reduced; that discrimination in rates charged may be eliminated; that
the use of the highways for the transportation by
motor vehicles for hire may be restricted to the
extent required by the necessity of the general
public, and that the various transportation agencies of the state may be adjusted and correlated
so that public highways may serve the best interest of the general public" (Emphasis added.)
Through Section 34 the Legislature has indicated that
the best interests of the people of the State of Utah
and/or the localities to be served necessarily incorporDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ates the existing transportation industry as well as highway utilization by all public sectors. In the hearing on
July 26, 1974, the parties stipulated that the protesting
motor carriers who constitute the substantial part of the
motor carrier industry within the area authorized to be
served by Mary A. Murphy would be materially and
adversely affected if Mary A. Murphy's contract motor
carrier permit were transferred. The harm to be encountered by transfer of the permit was established in
the record and perceived by the Commission. This was
a necessary element in its decision in concluding that
transfer of the permit was not in the best interests of
the people of the State of Utah and/or the localities to
be served.
The plaintiffs suggest that the court should consider
the rationale set forth in Collett, et al. v. Public Service
Commission, et al., 116 Utah 413, 211 P. 2d 195 (1949),
and Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167,
321 P. 2d 644 (1958). Plaintiffs admit that the operating
authority transferred in those cases in each instance was
a certificate of public convenience and necessity of a
common motor carrier and in no way involved contract
motor carrier permits. Plaintiffs urge that logic compels that the rule relating to transfer of common motor
carrier certificates be applied to the transfer of contract
motor carrier permits. They do this even though the
Commission's rules are directly to the contrary.
The Commission has historically recognized the distinction between common and contract motor carriers
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and has provided separate sets of rules to govern the
transfer of their authorities. Rule III of the Commission
as discussed above sets forth the criteria for the transfer
of contract motor carrier permits. The regulation governing the transfer of common motor carrier certificates is
set forth in the Commission's Motor Carrier Rules and
Regulations No. 3 as its Rule II. The burden of proof
with respect to the two types of motor carriers is substantially different. Rule II provides in pertinent part:
"A joint application shall be filed by the persons
involved which application shall request authority for the one person to discontinue operations
as a motor carrier and for the other person to
assume and take over said operations as a motor
carrier. The person desiring to assume said operating rights shall comply with the provisions of
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing for
a ne wcertificate of convenience and necessity
except that said person will not be required to
prove convenience and necessity." (Emphasis
added.)
The distinction between common and contract motor carriers has historically been recognized by the Commission and also by this court. In Rio Grande Motor
Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 377,
445 P. 2d 990 (1968), this court said at 21 Utah 2d 380:
"The first comprehensive act was passed by the
legislature in 1933 (Chap. 53, S. L. U. 1933).
Article II thereof relates to the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity and the
regulation of cojnmon motor carriers; while ArtiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cle III deals separately with contract motor carriers and the issuance of operating permits to
them. This separate recognition and treatment
of these different types of service has been continued in all subsequent enactments. * * *"
Also see McCarthy, et al. v. Public Service Commission,
et al., 111 Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220 (1947), at 111 Utah
494. Different standards must be applied to contract
motor carriers than common motor carriers because of
the differing types of service performed by them. The
distinguishing characteristic of the common carrier is
that it transports for all persons who request such service
where as the contract carrier renders a transportation
service only to specific parties with whom it has contracts to do so. Realty Purchasing Company v. Public
Service Commission, 9 Utah 2d 375, 345 P. 2d 606 (1959).
Because the contract motor carrier serves only those
with whom it has contracts, the Commission must be
in a position to determine whether or not the transfer
of the permit is supported by the contracting shippers
and whether the transfer is in the public interest. The
rationale for requiring a different burden of proof from
the contract motor carrier than the common motor carrier is set forth in Ratner—Control; Emery Transportation Co.—Purchase—Gordon, 57 M. C. C. 385 (1951).
In the Ratner case, Emery Transportation Company, a
contract motor carrier, sought to purchase the operating
authority of Lawrence Gordon, also a contract motor
carrier. The Commission denied the proposed transfer
of the permit and at page 393 stated its rationale:
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"In Baggett Transp. Co.—Purchase—De Tar
Distributing Co., 56 M. C. C. 563, where the
vendor, a contract carrier, had discontinued service, we stated:
The traffic formerly transported by vendor has
been absorbed, in part, by competing carriers,
with the remainder being transported by the
shipper for its own account as a private carrier.
There is no evidence of record that any shipper
has expressed a need for the service proposed by
vendee, that existing service in vendor's territory is inadequate or unsatisfactory, or that existing carriers could not, if called upon to do so,
absorb the traffic now being transported by Atlas in private carriage. Theire is no evidence
showing that vendor's discontinuance of operations has in any way inconvenienced its shipper,
or other shippers formerly served by it. The conclusion is warranted that present carriers are
satisfactorily meeting the shipper's needs for
contract-carrier service. The circumstance that
vendor's discontinuance of service occurred without the knowledge or consent of vender, has no
bearing on the question whether the purchase
would be consistent with the public interest.
The facts here are similar to those in numerous
other proceedings where it has been found that
it would not be consistent with the public interest to permit the acquisition and reinstitutvon of common-carrier operations, which had
been discontinued by the vendor, in the absence
of evidence indicating a need for resumption
of service. Fish Transport Co., Inc.—Purchase
Aiello, 50 M. C. C. 729. The fact that contractcarrier rights are involved here does not, of itself, warrant approval in the absence of similar
evidence.
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"Gordon, as indicated, served only one shipper,
Food Fair Stores, In. The traffic which he formerly handled for that concern is now transported partly in private carriage by the shipper
and partly in common carriage by certain motorcarrier protestants. The transaction involves the
purchase of bare operating rights, with no goingconcern value or good will. Gordon has ceased
to be a competitiue factor. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
In keeping within the present body of statutory law,
the Commission properly concluded:
"* * * Critical to the transfer of a contract
carrier permit is the introduction by applicant
of evidence that the grant of the application will
not be detrimental to the best interests of the
people of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to be served. Additionally, applicants must
demonstrate that existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service. Applicants have not met their burden of
proof and the transfer of the contract carrier
permit from Mary A. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering Transfer, to Pickering Transfer Company,
Inc., should be denied." (Vol. 1, p. 56.)
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION UNDERLYING THE APPLICATION
AND THE PROPOSED TRANSFEREE HAS
FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FITNESS
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AND ABILITY TO CONDUCT THE OPERATION.
The Commission concluded in its Order under date
of October 30, 1974, that the transferee had not established that it was ready, willing and able to operate the
certificate and permit which it proposed to acquire from
Mary A. Murphy. The Commission also concluded that
there was no agreement between the transferor and the
transferee pursuant to which it could find that the terms
of the proposed transaction were consistent with the
public interest (R. 56).
In a transfer proceeding, the proposed transferee
must establish that it has the financial ability, experience, and capability to carry on the business of the
transferror and that it is fit to do so. In the instant matter, all the financial data submitted by the transferee was
that of the transferror, although it was stipulated by
protestants that certain aspects of that data could be
considered the pro forma statements of the transferee
(R. 197). No actual financial data was ever presented
on behalf of the transferee. The fitness of the proposed
transferee was placed in issue and not satisfactorily explained by the transferee (R. 185-186).
No contract was offered in evidence demonstrating
that any agreement had been reached between the transferror and the transferee. The only agreement offered
was a contract of purchase between Max W. Young and
Mary A. Murphy, which contract was identified as ExDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hibit 4 (R. 5-10). Exhibit 4 also raised the issue of the
real party in interest and whether the plaintiff, Pickering
Transfer Company, Inc. was in fact the proposed transferee. That issue was not resolved on the record.
The Commission had no evidence before it whatsoever from which it could conclude that the applicant had
the financial ability, experience, fitness and capability
to carry on the business, if any, conducted by Mary A.
Murphy. Further, there was no contract of purchase between the plaintiffs from which the Commission could
ascertain the terms of their agreement, if any, and their
intentions with respect to operating and financing the
proposed business.
CONCLUSION
In the instant matter, the Commission properly applied its regulations and the law to exercise the responsibility imposed on it by the Legislature. There is ample
basis in the record to support the Commission's findings
and conclusions and the Commission's action is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a wise decision supported by
the record and should be sustained.
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